



GENERAL ASSEMBLY
SECRETARIAT —
DIRECTORATE-GENERAL

XLIX^a Legislature
Fourth Session

SPECIAL COMMISSION ON FUTURES

File S/C

Distributed: 112/2023

30 November 2023

SECOND WORLD FUTURES SUMMIT

**Participation in a virtual colloquium organized by the International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance (IDEA) on issues related to the summit**

Verbatim transcript of the session held on
30 November 2023

ATTENDANCE

Chair : Legislator Rodrigo Goñi (Chairman).

Members : Legislator Carmen Sanguinetti and Legislators Aldo Charbonnier, Juan Andrés Ramírez and Sebastián Valdomir.

Secretariat : María Elena Morán (Secretary), Vladimir De Bellis (Secretary), and Sofía Martorano and Joseline Rattaro (Deputy Secretaries).

SPECIAL COMMISSION ON FUTURES

Virtual colloquium organized by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral

Assistance —IDEA— on issues related to the Second World Summit of

Committees of the Future

(Meeting held on 30 November 2023).

MR. FERNÁNDEZ (As interpreted).— Good afternoon.

(The time is 12:35).

—We are here, on the other side of the world, and welcome you to the event
Unraveling Democracy.

We will be talking a little about something you may already have seen in the news:
artificial intelligence.

I do not want to take up any more time, so I would like to invite our Secretary-General,
Kevin Casas-Zamora, to make the introductory remarks.

MR. CASAS-ZAMORA (As interpreted).— Thank you very much.

Good afternoon, ambassadors, representatives of the Council of Member States of
International IDEA, members of the advisory boards and distinguished guests. I would like to extend
a very warm welcome to all of you to this event on artificial intelligence and democracy,
the last in this series.

For those here in Stockholm, it is a real pleasure to welcome you here,
at our headquarters. We also welcome the many participants who
are joining us online.

My name is Kevin Casas-Zamora, Secretary-General of International IDEA. As many of you know, this is an organization with 34 member states and a mandate to support democracy around the world.

We are honored to have had our headquarters here in Sweden since the founding of our institute, almost thirty years ago. We also have offices around the world and work in various ways with different partners in more than sixty countries. Our work combines knowledge production with capacity building, the fostering of dialogue and policy advocacy.

International IDEA has worked specifically on digital issues for many years, from digital oversight of digital finance to codes of conduct for online campaigns. Recently, however, we launched a new workstream focused more specifically on the impacts, risks and opportunities that digitalization creates for democracies. In this context, the growing influence of AI —artificial intelligence—, as you might expect, is of the utmost importance.

In the rest of my remarks today, I would like to give you an overview of how we see artificial intelligence and its intersection with our mandate and with democracy. Let me begin with a brief anecdote.

While preparing for this event, I asked ChatGPT for some famous quotations about democracy, and it quickly gave me ten, many of which were very wise. As far as I can tell, they were all spoken by real people. But here is the thing: of the ten people it quoted, eight were Americans, nine were men and all ten were from the Western world. I do not take this as evidence of some kind of conspiracy with bad

intentions built into the program, but rather that ChatGPT and other large language models reflect the internet and its human users, including their biases.

This anecdote highlights broader questions about which perspectives are prioritized in public discourse. But if we want a more democratic and inclusive society, we cannot rely on prejudice in the name of technological expertise. This ability to narrow things down, intentionally or otherwise, is one of the challenges that artificial intelligence poses to democracy.

The rise of artificial intelligence can also promote disinformation, especially online, and shift power among individuals, corporations and governments, particularly on matters of privacy. Yet the same technology has the potential to improve and revitalize democracy. Digitalization reduces costs by creating new arenas for citizen engagement and improves sources of information; artificial intelligence is a fundamental part of this. To give you just a few examples from one continent, companies in Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya are using artificial intelligence to engage voters and facilitate their enrollment and registration; they can also help people become informed and exercise their democratic rights.

We therefore need to discuss how to mitigate the risks posed by artificial intelligence while exploring and making use of the opportunities for democracy.

The time for this discussion is now, because many of the rules that will govern artificial intelligence are being decided at this very moment. The European Union is finalizing the regulation that will establish the legal framework for artificial intelligence in Europe. The United States has just issued its first presidential executive order on artificial intelligence, and at the AI Safety Summit organized by the

United Kingdom, twenty-eight countries from every continent committed to working on AI research and governance. The Council of Europe is working on a framework convention; the United Nations is assembling a high-level advisory group, and the list goes on and on. We must ensure that democracy is part of this global conversation, and International IDEA is well placed to help lead this effort.

All our areas of expertise will be affected by the adoption of artificial intelligence. In that sense, every aspect of our work will be influenced, and our institute must encourage and facilitate dialogue on this subject. That brings me back to today's topic. This session features an excellent panel with perspectives from government and the private sector. That diversity is essential because effective AI management will require contributions from government, business and civil society.

I am very excited about this expanded digitalization work, which will enable us to work with a wide range of stakeholders and find common ground for the future of democracy and humanity, which is a fundamental issue.

Today's event is part of that collaboration, and to guide us through this discussion, we are fortunate to have Alberto Fernández, a leading figure in digitalization programs and democracy.

Once again, it is wonderful to have you here today, and I look forward to the start of this discussion, which will give us much to think about.

MR. FERNÁNDEZ (As interpreted).— Thank you, Kevin Casas-Zamora.

I am Alberto Fernández, Head of Digitalization and Democracy, and today I will be moderating this panel.

I always have mixed feelings when we talk about artificial intelligence. I am impressed by the technology; it is incredible. I think everyone is impressed by ChatGPT, and I love this new trend of everyone asking it to create something, as though we were making a pizza and adding different ingredients; it is clearly astonishing. The technology is incredible because it can help doctors detect cancers earlier than was possible in the past; it can help us understand data better and also reveal society's vulnerabilities. Some of the fundamental problems we face in our democratic societies are that, when we acquire the technology and gain access to generative artificial intelligence, we may become vulnerable to manipulation.

(The connection is briefly interrupted).

—Once again, I would like to stress that we have heard about self-regulation, and I think companies working primarily on human rights consider it very important as a guiding principle, but we cannot simply rely on that. What we have seen with social media in recent years is that we have been asking —please!— for information about how the system works, and we are only receiving it now, despite all our insistence. I think we must not make that mistake again: we must push for greater transparency about how artificial intelligence is developed, and ensure that we have regulations requiring access for governments and also for the civil society affected.

For me, the other major lesson of working with artificial intelligence is that we must properly ensure diversity when drafting regulations. From the outset, we have worked in a very broad coalition, broader than other coalitions. For example, we have been working with organizations defending the rights of migrants and

minorities, which has enabled us to broaden the issues raised by different groups so that we can include them. That is just one example of the aspects that need to be taken into account.

Another aspect is emotion recognition, which some say is extremely important. Because we were working with Europe, we asked whether there was a member of an organization representing autistic people, and there was. We need to consider people with different sensitivities, who experience different emotional impacts. In that sense, we need to include them too. That was very interesting for us and showed the value of raising our standards. It also changes our position on this somewhat. Those are the most important points.

The last thing I want to say is that we must be bold. Not all innovation is good simply because it is innovation. Regulation should seek to encourage certain advances and avoid promoting others. We must know what we want and what we do not want, rather than plunging blindly into technological changes, because some may have very negative impacts.

Thank you very much.

MR. JATO (As interpreted).— I would like to ask some questions and continue with the issue of regulation's role, especially in defending digital rights. How can they be protected when we are talking about the development of artificial intelligence internationally?

Let me return to rules and regulation. We do want to regulate technologies, and we must find a balance between innovation and regulation. That is a key issue and is not easy to address. I know of people

working on disarmament, for example. I keep wondering whether we can have an effective regulatory framework that is not ultimately global, because we will always face the problem of people or countries outside a regulatory framework that manage to develop technologies regarded as unacceptable or inappropriate in other systems, which in turn may create an imbalance in the system. We run that risk. I think this may be one of the most important challenges. Eventually, we could move from regulation at European Union level to a global level. This is an area in which I hope we can play an important role.

As I said, I also want to return to capacity building, which I consider essential and in which I think the Swedish Government can play an important role. We are currently looking at how to use our development cooperation to promote digital resilience and digital rights; both have a technical dimension and a rights dimension, which I think is fundamental.

MS. ÖVREBY (As interpreted).— I would like to ask a question.

Essentially, your work is to build a bridge between governments, companies and business management, where you constantly encounter these kinds of issues. So I am curious about how governments and companies can collaborate to ensure that these advances benefit democracy and politics. What would you like that collaboration to look like? What would you like to see from governments? What would you like governments to hear from you?

Thank you very much.

A PARTICIPANT (As interpreted).— I believe the president of our organization visited Sweden and many other organizations, including the one in Brussels,

emphasizing the importance of being responsible and, at the same time, bold with these technologies. Why bold? Because of the enormous contributions these technologies can make and the opportunity to make the most of the information available: mitigating climate change, advancing medicine and medical practice, while also reducing administrative burdens and increasing our overall knowledge. In these matters, we must be bold. On the other side is our responsibility for what we must do as a company, in our individual practice; we must consider what we can do as a sector and how to work within our sectors to do things properly.

Last but not least is the cooperation we must develop with regulators. In other words, artificial intelligence is too important not to regulate, and I think you share that view. There are currently many discussions about this in Brussels. So what do we do in this area? I think we want to be a good partner to civil society organizations and governments, building capacity concerning this technology and how to work with it as an individual company.

I also fully agree that we must work with the European Union and the United States, but we must work globally too.

The summit was criticized beforehand for inviting China, but I think it is really important to have a potential adversary at the table discussing these issues.

What we want, then, is to make the most of the potential for progress and see how to adopt artificial intelligence to improve productivity as a fundamental value. That is why we need regulatory frameworks: we must

ensure that the workforce benefits, since this is another very difficult area, as we mentioned.

In Sweden, we are very proud that, during the economic transition, we did not protect industries but workers; we see that we can help with product development, but we must also make sure we can protect people. That is a fundamental area. We want to promote responsibility and reduce the risks of misuse, which requires governance and a multistakeholder approach.

We must consider what discussions to have, what research to undertake, and what benefits and risks to consider. Through the resulting dialogue, we are always seeking to act as partners on these issues.

Last but not least, we must make sure we improve global security. Let us prevent malicious actors from exploiting the information available. We must work with our technical, commercial and political partners to minimize the potential for misuse. We have developed a secure artificial intelligence framework, and this is one example of how we try to look at the different aspects of cybersecurity involving the use of artificial intelligence. We have also worked on governance and public-private partnerships to address these issues.

Thank you.

A PARTICIPANT (As interpreted).— I am new to this field, but I have been doing this work for two and a half months and am absolutely fascinated by the role played by industrial sectors. For example, if you look at Ukraine, its cyberdefense is largely managed by companies such as Google and Microsoft, rather than by governments. Governments are involved, but the resources provided by the cybersecurity industry are crucial to

cyberdefense, and that is something new: the private sector helping defend another country that is under attack.

Ten, twenty, thirty or forty years ago, by contrast, all major innovations were essentially, in one way or another, sponsored or organized by states. There were state universities, and the Manhattan Project may be the most important example of this. Today, innovations are developed by private companies without interference, assistance or state funding. I think these two examples show those of us representing governments that we cannot do without cooperation with the sector, whether we like it or not. We cannot do without this cooperation. I think Google knows very well how to act politically and what can be achieved through countries' cyberattacks. The geopolitical dimension is very important.

Whenever we discuss geopolitics, we must also discuss the use of digital technologies by authoritarian countries. We might think, for example, of doctors who detect cancer earlier, but many authoritarian countries think only about increasing their power and deepening their authoritarian capacity. Artificial intelligence can have that negative effect, with many consequences for development and governance.

I would like to ask Stefanie Harter whether she thinks the international community, which supports sustainable development, is ready for these challenges.

What should we do, and what should we consider, to ensure that artificial intelligence does not lead to repression that undoes all the remarkable work certain organizations are doing to improve governance and human rights? How can we build on that?

I know it is not an easy question, but I would say it applies equally to our countries. I think what we must do is teach, raise awareness, improve transparency in schools, and invest in technological and ethical education from a very early age, because children and young people who share content unwittingly promote disinformation, without even knowing it. This is very important, and we must act. I have discussed it with specialists who argue that it does not help to label something as disinformation when we identify it as information, because people want to believe. We therefore need to teach ethics to safeguard freedom of expression and also prevent harm to democracies. Of course, people say that autocracies seek to undermine democratic countries, but sometimes their efforts find fertile ground. It is not technology itself that undermines trust in the system; the system must become resilient. Of course, democracies cannot engage in counterpropaganda, but they can invest in independent media and inform all citizens, and that is important.

Finally, I am pleased to have access here and that we have managed to establish this as an influential nongovernmental force, because when we seek a multistakeholder approach, we face private actors and very powerful companies. In my view, it is equally important to create economic incentives to use beneficial artificial intelligence, to consider what can be done to change the social media model and to scrutinize and regulate the sale of information and training data. I find that task rather difficult with monopolies. As was mentioned, private companies are involved in wars, and when I think that Starlink is the only satellite system that can guarantee data transmission, I feel a little concerned, to be honest, because I would prefer it not to be only private companies that

could eventually guarantee that peace can be achieved. Why do I say this? Because autocracies —and in my view this is the most crucial point— have access to enormous amounts of data and the corresponding tools, which ultimately allow them to consolidate their power further. Indeed, that is their dilemma: because they have no elections, they never really find out, or want to know, what the population wants and what they should do to avoid a revolution. In the past, they therefore had to rely on surveys. Now China, for example, has an enormous database and the tools to know how to manage the political spheres of commercial societies, which gives them an advantage and also shapes what will happen in the long term. I think that even in our countries —and this also applies to partner countries— voters will eventually realize that politicians use artificial intelligence to design their platforms based on the data available and the results obtained through data collection and opinion polls. Then they will lose legitimacy, because whom can citizens believe when they think a machine has been creating a platform? These are developments that I consider important. What we must do is raise awareness, teach people to distinguish between things and, ultimately, also consider where the values lie.

Let me say one last thing about regulation, because I was somewhat intrigued by what you said, Ambassador, about moving from regulation at United States level to a global level. I think that is the problem: this is not a struggle between technologies, because technology always carries a system of values and a worldview that are exported and attached to it. The more countries, such as China and India, develop their own technologies, the more they will naturally have their own ideas about what they want to convey.

I suppose that in the future we will really need to be ready and prepared, either to find compromises or to defend our own system. As you also said, governments must rely on advice from companies and organizations such as Access Now to formulate good policy, because it is impossible to regulate the use of technology in its entirety, and that is not really what we want either.

MR. FERNÁNDEZ (As interpreted).— Thank you very much; I find this very interesting.

I wanted to ask all of you a question and propose something difficult, but you can answer in one minute.

There seems to be an urgent need for regulation or principles that work worldwide, global recommendations, a global agreement. Those of us who work on AI policy are told every week —it never stops—: “This is the most important thing for the framework agreement on one thing or another.” Yet when seeking an agreement or an international framework, we must ensure that artificial intelligence does not harm democracy. I am not even talking about strengthening it, but at least ensuring that it harms neither democracy nor human rights.

Is that possible? Can we do it in the current geopolitical situation? There is an imbalance when we seek to defend democratic rights. Is it possible? And if not, can we achieve coherence among the processes already underway?

You have one minute, and answering is voluntary.

What are we trying to regulate? When we try to regulate artificial intelligence, we are trying to cover something very broad, and regulation based solely

on the technology will not resolve the issues, because artificial intelligence enables many trends. Surveillance is one example: we have seen a proliferation in the use of spyware and biometric surveillance. Artificial intelligence is enabling this development, allowing governments and also the private sector to monitor the population increasingly closely. Regulating artificial intelligence will not solve that problem, so this must be taken into account.

In the Council of Europe negotiations, for example, there is a major issue concerning governments' cybersecurity, which will not go away. It might go away, but not simply because we regulate artificial intelligence. In terms of harmonization, I think it is misleading. The major risk we face with worldwide or global agreements is that, once things become sufficiently global, they start slipping out of our hands. So if we set the bar too high, we may not succeed.

There is a level below legally binding regulations. Those norms may not be as effective as fully fledged regulations, but I think there is still considerable value in including them, guiding those countries' activities and stigmatizing those that fail to comply. At the level of norms, I think there is at least an opportunity to make some progress. I think it is worth exploring this whole issue. We have norms for ICTs at the United Nations, and they can be expanded. We also have international norms such as the human rights convention; these things do not disappear simply because technology emerges.

MS. HARTER (As interpreted).— May I add something?

MR. FERNÁNDEZ (As interpreted).— Yes.

MS. HARTER (As interpreted).— I think that, ultimately, when we have rules, we must also ensure that those responsible for enforcing them have the skills, are well paid, are diverse and efficient, and perform well in their work. Ultimately, they must know how to distinguish what is worth defending, because we need to reconsider things. This applies to us as well as to other countries that are willing to join a community seeking to regulate. I think this is important. I have worked for an organization that fell victim to a deepfake. Suddenly you see your colleagues on Russian news with completely distorted messages, and when I look at what is happening there, I do not see Russia being willing to cooperate in the foreseeable future. So we must ensure that our people are competent and know why they are regulating.

MS. ÖVREBY (As interpreted).— I think we have a very important point here: we cannot choose to export one value for technology and make it the only one. We always try to improve dialogue, at least between the United Nations and the United States, and have productive discussions about the many areas we see as values to defend, value systems within which we can work to identify a norm for a large part of the world. I also agree with the previous speaker that a global agreement is unlikely in the short term, but we can at least take steps and work toward it over time, holding discussions with other parts of the world and, of course, including other countries in practice. This means we will build and develop our technology around the world, so we must make sure we have large offices in Nigeria, for example, as well as in India. In other words, we must ensure that the technology we build for people works for all

people. I think democracies uniting would be a huge step in the right direction. I represent an intergovernmental organization of democracies and consider this very important.

MR. FERNÁNDEZ (As interpreted).— We have about fifteen minutes for questions from the audience. I encourage you to use that time, be specific and, if you wish to address a particular person, please say so, so that we can give the floor to the appropriate speaker.

A PARTICIPANT (As interpreted).— Thank you. This has been wonderful. I have learned a great deal and want to look at this from another angle. I will refer to something mentioned somewhat in passing —by Andrés Jato— and I am sorry if I am about to make some of our guests uncomfortable, but that is not my intention.

Let us consider regulating artificial intelligence for a moment and imagine the best of all worlds, in which we could regulate things to maximize the good and minimize the bad. Developing artificial intelligence as a technology requires such resources that, in practice, it is concentrating power in very few corporate actors, who wield tremendous power over all of us. That in itself is inimical to democracy, whose underlying purpose is to disperse and distribute power. I think this raises very uncomfortable questions about antitrust policy and ensuring that the market functions in relation to artificial intelligence. There is even —and this is where things become really uncomfortable— the question of nationalizing assets, because the best analogy I can think of in terms of its power is what it would be like if nuclear energy had been developed by private actors, which was not the case. So how

do we deal with the fact that developing artificial intelligence may harm democracy by concentrating power and empowering actors who are not accountable?

MR. FERNÁNDEZ (As interpreted).— Perhaps we can take a couple more questions, but I have an online question to read on behalf of the futures committee of the Government of Uruguay. It reads: “We are gathered today in an extraordinary session to participate in this event, and we would like to ask how you think parliaments should position themselves in the evolving context of artificial intelligence and its imminent advances.”

Perhaps we can take a couple more questions.

A PARTICIPANT (As interpreted).— My question is for Sara Övrebý and Daniel Leufer. As consumers, we all have a digital footprint. I speak as a human rights and democracy activist in a country that, let us say, is not an autocracy but is authoritarian. I am from Turkey, which is what I have in mind. If I wanted to erase my digital footprint to have a kind of digital passport, how would that be possible? For example, I gave speeches here while being persecuted in Turkey. Later, when traveling to Turkey, I had to ask the associations that had posted my speeches on YouTube to remove them so I could travel there safely. I therefore wonder how we can have a protected digital identity.

Thank you.

A PARTICIPANT (As interpreted).— Artificial intelligence is advancing rapidly. Something like AGI —artificial general intelligence— would supposedly make the best decisions, as self-driving vehicles do.

Google will launch Gemini in 2024, and OpenAI is working on this. I wonder whether this has anything to do with better policies, how they are developed, and whether it could potentially affect democracy in general.

Thank you.

MR. FERNÁNDEZ (As interpreted).— We now have four questions. Do not feel obliged to answer them all, but perhaps Sara Övrebý could answer some of them.

MS. ÖVREBY (As interpreted).— On antitrust and the concentration of power, there are many regulations. There are precedents in the United States and Europe, and I think this issue will be resolved. Work has been underway on this.

The Digital Markets Act, for example, is an attempt to define things and ensure that companies do not exercise a... —let me see how to put this— that they do not have too much power in a particular market. Others may be able to speak more authoritatively about this.

As for having a new digital identity —it is difficult to speak for the whole world—, in practice, if you want to remove yourself from Google, you can export all your data from all its services through Google My Account to remove all traces from all the services. At least in Europe, you can invoke the right-to-be-forgotten law to remove our traces online, depending on which service you ask to be removed, and they have the right to do this for you.

As for the role of parliamentarians —I think it was Uruguay that asked— and politicians, I think it is extremely important. There is nothing

we, as Google and many other companies working with politicians to reach agreement on regulations in different areas, would like more than to see things move forward. We want politicians to want to learn, take an interest and understand, because, as a company, my role is to explain what we do and how we see it. Politicians, in turn, must take into account our perspective and those of all the other stakeholders. The role of parliamentarians is therefore absolutely important. In Sweden, I try to encourage that dialogue.

A PARTICIPANT (As interpreted).— I am not sure I understood the question about AGI, that is, Generative Artificial Intelligence. The Google product is an experiment we conducted. We call it an “experiment” because we want to be very careful about the products we launch. It is also a smaller language model, a more compact one. We want to avoid unintended consequences. I do not know the exact date, but you will certainly hear about it when it is released.

MR. FERNÁNDEZ (As interpreted).— Would anyone else like to take a question? Do you have anything to say about any of these questions?

I would like to make a brief comment on the concentration of power resulting from the development of these technologies, from a slightly different angle to the specific question raised.

We have not discussed this yet, but it is potentially linked to democracy and the future development of democratic discourse. What would happen if automation supported by generative artificial intelligence completely changed the labor market, with low-skilled or even medium-skilled workers replaced by robots or, essentially, by automation? We can envisage a potential scenario in which already developed countries with a strong technology

sector would continue to employ engineers and people in related fields, while other parts of the world —potentially; this does not mean it will happen, but it could— would experience high unemployment because workers would not be needed. We can therefore envisage the concentration or shifting of power, or the reinforcement of existing inequalities, as a potential scenario. There is considerable debate about this, but it is not impossible, because we can at least see the trends. I think this will have a very significant impact on democracies, both among countries and within them.

Perhaps all this calls for another discussion.

MR. JATO (As interpreted).— I would like to say something about monopoly because, in fact, I had it in my notes.

On facial recognition, I want to point out that these technologies are also exported. Technologies create dependence and involve costs. What we can see is that, when nondemocratic countries sell and export these technologies to other partners, they establish strong ties. I would also agree that this reinforces monopoly, which I find dangerous.

I would also say that the barriers to entering the market are quite high. I understand that Google seeks cooperation with parliamentarians and politicians, but other entities are also involved and find it difficult to gain access to them, so they resort to an alternative approach to how the market should be regulated. I see some danger of a self-perpetuating system, because there is a clash between large monopolies and countries that can afford the technology. Inequalities will grow, not only in the labor market but also between rich countries able to pay for the development of these technologies and other countries that cannot afford it.

MR. FERNÁNDEZ (As interpreted).— I agree with much of what has been said.

I think the concentration of power is one of the most important issues at the moment, because we are at a crossroads concerning open source and how to make all these models work. There is a whole issue here concerning negotiations on artificial intelligence. You may know that a couple of European startups—one in France and one in Germany— were developing open-source artificial intelligence, whereas discussions in the United States—such as those involving Google— tend mainly to warn against its use. For example, access to ChatGPT through an API was considered as a way to control its use better. Both approaches entail serious risks, but I would rather take the risk of open source than reinforce the existing monopolies that have built up in recent years. Parliamentarians have already mentioned this, but there are all these trends, as Stefanie Harter said. One is the cloud. If you integrate generative artificial intelligence into government, for example, you become a customer of cloud computing. Amazon has invested an enormous amount in the cloud. We must consider the kind of pressure surrounding the adoption of artificial intelligence as a whole. Who owns cloud computing? Who will benefit economically or financially? Some companies criticize the approach, and they blame one another. Some use open source; others criticize it, saying it promotes the proliferation of crimes involving child sexual abuse material and the abuse of women. In other words, I repeat, they blame one another. So we must define the values integrated into each system, and we see a need to start controlling content on social media. We will continue discussing this.

Thank you very much.

MR. FERNÁNDEZ (As interpreted).— We have run out of time, but I still have a very simple question, or rather I would like a very simple answer from the four panelists. You can answer in one word.

In five years, do you think our view of artificial intelligence will be more positive or more negative than it is now?

MS. HARTER (As interpreted).— My microphone was muted; what I said was “complicated.”

MR. LEUFER (As interpreted).— I think it will be like social media: positive at first, but things will sour a little in the following years.

MR. JATO (As interpreted).— I am afraid I would answer much the same, but I was born an optimist. I hope I have learned from social media.

MR. FERNÁNDEZ (As interpreted).— I would like to thank Stefanie Harter, Andrés Jato, Daniel Leufer and Sara Övrebý for their contributions and perspectives, and thank all of you for attending this event.

Thank you very much.

The meeting is adjourned.

(The time is 14:12).

